The South African Institute of International Affairs has put into circulation its
latest policy report on Russia-African relations. In the introductory chapter,
Steven Gruzd, Samuel Ramani and Cayley Clifford – have summarized various
aspects of the developments between Russia and Africa over the past few
years and finally questioned the impact of Russia’s policy on Africa.
According to Steven Gruzd, Samuel Ramani and Cayley Clifford, this special far-
reaching policy report includes academic research from leading Russian, African
and international scholars. It addresses the dimensions of Russian power
projection in Africa, new frontiers of Russian influence and provides a roadmap
towards understanding how Russia is perceived in Africa.
It highlights narratives about anti-colonialism and describes how these sources of
solidarity are transmitted by Russian elites to their African public. For seeking
long-term influence, Russian elites have oftentimes used elements of anti-
colonialism as part of the current policy to control the perceptions of Africans and
primarily as new tactics for power projection in Africa.
The reports delved into the historical fact that after the collapse of the Soviet era,
already more than three decades, Russia is resurgent in Africa. While Russia has
been struggling to make inroads into Africa these years, the only symbolic event
was the first Russia-Africa Summit held in Sochi, which fêted heads of state from
43 African countries and showcased Moscow’s great power ambitions.
Moscow has signed bilateral agreements to participate in various economic
directions with many African countries. It has also signed military-technical
agreements with over 20 African countries and has secured lucrative mining and
nuclear energy contracts on the continent. Russia exports more arms to Africa
than the United States, France and China combined. It uses private military
contractors.
While it has made thousands of promises and signed bilateral agreements, Russia
is largely invisible in economic sectors, keeps a remote distance from participating
in building critical infrastructures and investing in industrial spheres. Moscow
simply builds relations on illusions and lacks the capacity and overwhelming
power to realize its policy goals in Africa. During critical times of coronavirus
pandemic, Moscow terribly failed to supply 300 million Sputnik V vaccines
through the African Union.
Russia’s expanding influence in Africa are compelling, but a closer examination
further reveals a murkier picture. Despite Putin’s lofty trade targets, Russia’s trade
with Africa stands at just $20 billion, which is lower than that of India or Turkey.
The report authors said that the renewed attention by Russia to Africa presents
both risks and opportunities for the continent, especially in this changing
geopolitical situation. But the key question arises: Who is courting whom?
The report points to the fact that African countries have engaged with Russia in a
‘business-as-usual fashion’ and have either refrained from condemning Russia’s
aggression or from expressing explicit solidarity with Ukraine. Nevertheless, over
half of all African states sided with the West in condemning Russia’s aggression
against Ukraine in UN General Assembly votes in March and October 2022.
Russia’s major breakthroughs on the continent are confined to its support for
fragile states, such as Mali, or autocracies, such as Cameroon, as major regional
powers are reluctant to convert rhetorical cooperation into multidimensional
partnerships.
The authors further wrote that “Russia’s growing assertiveness in Africa is a driver
of instability and that its approach to governance encourages pernicious practices,
such as kleptocracy and autocracy promotion, and the dearth of scholarship on
Moscow’s post-1991 activities in Africa is striking.”
Records further show that Russia indeed kept a low profile for two decades after
the Soviet collapse. One particularly problematic assumption is that Russia’s
resurgence in Africa is a relatively recent phenomenon, which took hold at the tail
end of Putin’s second term from 2004 to 2008 and accelerated after Russia-West
relations soured over the 2014 Ukraine crisis and Russia’s annexation of Crimea.
Now Russia’s main tactics to expand its influence, such as debt forgiveness, arms
contracts to fragile states and resistance to US unilateralism, come from its
transition-era playbook and are not simply throwbacks to its Soviet-era
superpower status. These continuities and forces that have shaped them are
largely ignored in Western accounts and deserve granular attention.
In addition, Russia has used social media, state media and ‘political technologists’
to create distorted narratives of Russian largesse and to erode public support for
Western involvement in Africa. At times, image triumphs over reality, as Russian
narratives are more appealing than its actions. It is clear that Moscow’s approach
to Africa is customised and is not a mere extrapolation from Putin’s global
approach to foreign policy.
Moreover, the limited amplification of African voices causes sub-Saharan Africa to
be viewed as a passive pawn of Russian power projection and neglects the
perspectives of African civil society and the historical legacies that drive elites to
court the Kremlin. Africa’s agency is thus discounted and diminished.
On the other hand, Russian public diplomacy in Africa explores the targeted use of
historical ties, existing anti-Western narratives, state-centric approach and
educational programmes to enhance Moscow’s ‘soft power’ on the continent.
In Southern Africa, a pattern of ‘differentiated courtship’ emerges clearly. By
bridging Southern and Eastern Africa, its tactics include debt-for-development,
nuclear energy, military and paramilitary cooperation, disinformation campaigns
and election interference and sponsorship of political parties.
Further in the Horn of Africa, Russia’s tactics for influence projections span from
participating in anti-piracy missions to vaccine diplomacy.
The war in Ukraine has elevated the level of scrutiny of Russia’s actions both in
Europe and elsewhere in the world, including in Africa. Undeniably, Moscow is
wooing African elites to serve its interests, African states are trying to play off
Moscow, Washington, Brussels and Beijing for maximum advantage. While many
complexities and nuances still remain in the entire relationships, it necessary not
to over-generalize the unique features in the bilateral ties.
In the context of a multipolar geopolitical order, Russia’s image of cooperation
could be seen as highly enticing, but it is also based on illusions. Better still,
Russia’s posture is a clash between illusions and reality. “Russia, it appears, is a
neo-colonial power dressed in anti-colonial clothes,” says the report.
Simply put, Moscow’s strategic incapability, inconsistency and dominating opaque
relations are adversely affecting sustainable developments in Africa. Thus far,
Russia looks more like a ‘virtual great power’ than a genuine challenger to
European, American and Chinese influence.
The second Russia-Africa Summit – if it indeed goes ahead in July 2023 – will
provide an ideal opportunity to reflect on progress since the inaugural gathering in
2019, and attempt to separate bluster from the concrete facts on the ground. But,
‘who is courting whom’ in the current relations between Africa and Russia.
